失業救濟不是壞事英文寫作

Is unemployment benefit a good thing after all？

To most thoughtful people， unemployment benefit embodies a painful trade—off。 It's the mark of a civilised society， clubbing together to provide assistance to those in need。 It is also， regrettably， an incentive to remain unemployed。 At its worst， unemployment benefit pays people to watch daytime television; it is particularly pernicious if the skills of the jobless decay， and unemployment becomes unemployability。 Yet， at its best， it is a life—saver。

In balancing these two effects， it's hardly surprising that different societies have adopted very different systems。 According to the Organisation for Economic Co—operation and Development， member governments spent an average of 0。75 per cent of gross domestic product on unemployment benefits in 2006。 France spent nearly twice this sum， and Germany almost three times as much， while the US spent a third of the average， and the UK just over a quarter。 Germany spent more than 10 times as much as the UK， relative to GDP。

Paying people to stay out of work is an example of that increasingly familiar phenomenon， "moral hazard"， but moral hazard can be more fearsome in the theorist's imagination than it is in reality。 Does unemployment benefit really encourage people to duck work？ Unfortunately， the evidence suggests that it does： increases in benefits have repeatedly been linked with longer periods between jobs。

But new research from Raj Chetty， a young Berkeley economist， suggests that moral hazard may not be why more generous benefits seem to lead to more unemployment。 Chetty realised that unemployment benefit does not merely pay people to stay out of work; it also protects them from having to rush into an unsuitable job。 It is nothing to celebrate if unemployed engineers cannot afford to spend three months finding a job for which they are qualified， but are forced to work as estate agents to put food on the table。 A longer gap between jobs is sometimes preferable。

This is an interesting theory， but distinguishing between moral hazard and the effect of having some cash to hand is tough。 Chetty looked at sharp breaks in the unemployment insurance rules in the US， comparing one state's rules with another's， or examining moments when the rules changed。 One suggestive finding is that when unemployment insurance becomes more generous， not everybody lingers on benefits。 The median job—loser in the US has $200 when he loses his job and is unlikely to be able to borrow much， but some people have plenty of money in the bank when they find themselves unemployed。 Chetty found that those with savings do not take any longer to find a job when paid more generous benefits， while those with little in the kitty when they lose their jobs do。 This suggests that those without their own cash reserves are using unemployment benefits to buy themselves time to find the right job。

Of course， there may be many differences between people with savings and those without， so this merely suggests that Chetty is on to something。 But there are other clues — for instance， Chetty and two colleagues looked at the system in Austria， where severance pay is due to anyone employed for more than three years。 By looking at — for example — a factory closure in which lots of staff are fired simultaneously， they could treat severance pay almost as a randomised experiment。 Those lucky enough to get severance pay spent more time looking for a new job， despite the fact that severance pay provides no direct incentive to stay out of work。

Unemployment benefit does encourage unemployment in the short term; but that may be no bad thing。

失業救濟不是壞事

對多數有識之士而言，失業救濟體現了一種痛苦的權衡。它是文明社會的標誌，大家攜起手來為那些需要的人提供幫助。但令人遺憾的是，它也刺激了人們保持失業狀態。在最壞的情況下，失業救濟為那些大白天看電視的人提供了酬勞，尤其危險的是，如果失業者的技能退化，失業就變成了無就業能力。不過，在最好的情況下，它能夠挽救失業者的生活。

在平衡這兩種效應時，不同的`社會採取了截然不同的做法，這幾乎不令人驚訝。根據經濟合作與發展組織（OECD）的數據，2006年，各成員國政府用在失業 救濟上的平均花費佔國內生產總值（GDP）的0。75%。法國的比例幾乎是這個數字的兩倍，德國將近三倍，而美國是平均數字的三分之一，英國僅四分之一 強。德國失業救濟金佔GDP的比例，是英國的10倍以上。

為不工作的人支付報酬是"道德風險"的一個例子，人們對於這種現象越來越熟悉。但理論家想象中的道德風險，可能比現實中更為可怕。失業救濟真的鼓勵人們逃避工作嗎？不幸地是，有證據表明確實如此：在很多情況下，失業救濟金的上升與兩次就業之間的間隔時期延長存在關係。

但是，加州大學伯克利分校年輕的經濟學家拉吉切迪（Raj Chetty）的最新研究顯示，道德風險可能並非更慷慨的失業救濟導致更多失業的原因。切迪認為，失業救濟不僅為失業者提供了收入，同時使他們免於匆忙從 事一份不合適自己的工作。如果失業的工程師花不起3個月的時間尋找稱職的工作，而是被迫去當一名房地產經紀人來維持生計，那也沒有什麼值得慶賀的。在某些 情況下，兩次就業之間的間隔時期延長是可取的。

這是一個有趣的理論，但是將道德風險與手頭有一些現金可花的效應區別開相當困難。切迪研究了美國失業保險制度的明顯改變，將各州的制度進行比較，或研究制 度改變時的狀況。一個具有提示性的發現是：當失業救濟金增加時，並非所有人都對此留戀不捨。美國失業者的救濟金中值為200美元，他們不太可能借到很多 錢，但有些人失業時，在銀行有大量的存款。切迪發現，那些有存款的人在救濟金更高的時候，不願意失業太長時間，而那些沒有多少存款的人，則願意等上更長的 時間。這表明，那些自己沒有現金儲備的人正利用失業救濟，讓自己有充足的時間去尋找合適的工作。

當然，有存款的人與沒有存款的人的情況可能有很多不同，因此這只是表明，切迪發現了一些東西。但還有其他一些線索，比如，切迪和兩位同事研究了奧地利的制 度，該國任何就業三年以上的僱員都有解僱費。舉例來説，在觀察一家工廠倒閉、大量工人同時被裁掉時，他們可能把解僱費作為一種隨機實驗。那些足夠幸運的家 夥利用解僱費來花費更多的時間尋找一份新工作，儘管事實上，解僱費並沒有直接鼓勵人們不工作。

短期內，失業救濟確實鼓勵了失業，但這可能不是壞事。